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Abstract
In its decision on the Whaling in the Antarctic case, the International Court of  Justice 
used a sophisticated methodology for assessing the legality of  a whaling program allegedly 
designed to pursue purposes of  scientific research. Based on the combination of  two instru-
ments – margin of  appreciation and proportionality review – this methodology ultimately 
enabled the Court to reconcile apparently divergent needs: to grant a measure of  discretion 
to states in determining their domestic policy requirements and to exert an international 
control over discretionary powers. From a theoretical viewpoint, this approach can have far-
reaching implications and contribute to untie some still unresolved knots of  the proportional-
ity doctrine.
In a quite enigmatic passage in the Whaling in the Antarctic decision, the International 
Court of  Justice (ICJ) interpreted the first part of  Article VIII, paragraph 1, of  the 
International Convention for the Regulation of  Whaling Convention), which allows 
the states parties to grant a special permit to kill, take and treat whales ‘for purposes 
of  scientific research’.1 To interpret these five words, the Court used an analytical 
method. It first interpreted the notion of  ‘scientific research’, and then it passed on to 
interpret the notion ‘for purposes of ’. Ultimately, the Court found that the conduct of  
Japan pursuant to JARPA II, Japan’s whaling program in the Southern ocean, was not 
consistent with the Whaling Convention and could not be justified under the excep-
tion provided by Article VIII, paragraph 1.
* Professor of  International Law and European Union Law, University of  Rome ‘La Sapienza’. Email: 
enzo.cannizzaro@uniroma1.it.
1 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v.  Japan: New Zealand intervening), Judgment, 31 March 2014, ICJ 
Reports (2014) 226. International Convention for the Regulation of  Whaling (Whaling Convention) 
1946, 161 UNTS 72.
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1 Analytical Interpretation and a Twofold Standard 
of Review
This analytical approach was aimed to match the strategic lines of  Japan’s defence. 
In the course of  the proceedings, Japan had strenuously claimed its exclusive compe-
tence to issue a special permit to kill, take and treat whales for the purposes of  scien-
tific research under Article VIII. This competence was allegedly based on the existence 
of  a ‘margin of  appreciation’. According to Japan, this doctrine was recognized by 
every state party to the Convention as the power to determine the scope of  the scien-
tific research exception enshrined in Article VIII.2
The ICJ did not accept this claim. In a succinct finding, it held that the determina-
tion of  the terms ‘for purposes of  scientific research’ was part of  the interpretation of  
Article VIII of  the Whaling Convention and, therefore, could not be left, in its entirety, 
to the unilateral determination of  one of  its parties. In paragraph 61, it stated:
The Court considers that Article VIII gives discretion to a State party to the ICRW to reject the 
request for a special permit or to specify the conditions under which a permit will be granted. 
However, whether the killing, taking and treating of  whales pursuant to a requested special 
permit is for purposes of  scientific research cannot depend simply on that State’s perception.
This passage has a central role in the chain of  arguments that led to the decision. 
It is aimed at dismissing the idea that the Whaling Convention granted to its parties 
the unfettered discretion to determine unilaterally the scope of  the scientific research 
exception. However, while clarifying that the determination of  what is necessary and 
proper for the purposes of  scientific research does not depend entirely on the ‘sub-
jective perception’ of  a state, the Court did not identify the appropriate standard for 
assessing the legality of  Japan’s conduct.
This standard emerges from paragraph 67, where the ICJ expounded the program 
of  action along which it unfolded its subsequent reasoning:
When reviewing the grant of  a special permit authorizing the killing, taking and treating of  
whales, the Court will assess, first, whether the programme under which these activities occur 
involves scientific research. Secondly, the Court will consider if  the killing, taking and treating 
of  whales is ‘for purposes of ’ scientific research by examining whether, in the use of  lethal 
methods, the programme’s design and implementation are reasonable in relation to achieving 
its stated objectives. This standard of  review is an objective one.
These two passages seem to indicate the existence of  a double standard of  review that 
is to be applied distinctly to two distinct issues: whether ‘the program under which 
these activities occur involves scientific research’ and whether ‘the program’s design 
and implementation are reasonable in achieving its stated objectives’.
The difference between the two standards relates to the intensity of  review. A looser 
standard was used by the ICJ to determine the content and scope of  the notion of  
scientific research, which ‘cannot depend simply on a State’s perception’. A stricter 
standard was used instead to review whether the activities carried out by Japan were 
reasonably related to their stated objectives, namely for the purposes of  scientific 
2 Whaling in the Antarctic, supra note 1, paras 59–60.
Proportionality and Margin of  Appreciation in the Whaling Case 1063
research. The different intensity of  these two standards of  review was upheld by the 
reading of  the subsequent parts of  the decision. With regard to the notion of  ‘scien-
tific research’, the Court seems to have used a loose standard of  plausibility. While 
maintaining that this notion could not entirely depend on the unilateral determina-
tion of  a state, it abstained from using sophisticated techniques to interpret it. Quite 
the contrary, after a lengthy analysis of  the positions of  the parties to the proceedings, 
it came to the conclusion that it was not necessary ‘to offer a general definition’ of  that 
notion.3 This conclusion paved the way for the qualification of  JARPA II as a ‘scientific 
research’ project. Absent a uniform meaning of  this notion at the international law 
level, the mere existence of  elements of  scientific research in the programme – a very 
faint link indeed – was sufficient for the Court to avoid superimposing its own view on 
that of  the acting state.
The second standard is the much stricter standard of  proportionality, which 
emerges from the passages in which the ICJ engaged in a punctilious interpretation 
of  the terms ‘for purposes of ’. According to the Court, the assessment of  whether the 
elements of  a programme’s design and implementation are reasonable to achieve its 
scientific research objectives required a close consideration of  the various elements of  
the programme, including ‘decisions regarding the use of  lethal methods; the scale of  
the programme’s use of  lethal sampling; the methodology used to select sample sizes; 
a comparison of  the target sample sizes and the actual take; the time frame associated 
with a programme; the programme’s scientific output; and the degree to which a pro-
gramme co-ordinates its activities with related research projects’.4
The closing, enlightening passage of  this part of  the decision contains a magisterial 
depiction of  the difference between a subjective and an objective test:
An objective test of  whether a programme is for purposes of  scientific research does not turn 
on the intentions of  individual government officials, but rather on whether the design and 
implementation of  a programme are reasonable in relation to achieving the stated research 
objectives. Accordingly, the Court considers that whether particular government officials 
may have motivations that go beyond scientific research does not preclude a conclusion that 
a programme is for purposes of  scientific research within the meaning of  Article VIII. At the 
same time, such motivations cannot justify the granting of  a special permit for a programme 
that uses lethal sampling on a larger scale than is reasonable in relation to achieving the pro-
gramme’s stated research objectives. The research objectives alone must be sufficient to justify 
the programme as designed and implemented.5
Having clarified the difference between a subjective test and an objective test, this rea-
soning proceeded inexorably to its final outcome. The ICJ concluded that the JARPA 
II programme could fall within the scope of  the notion of  ‘scientific research’ under 
Article VIII of  the Whaling Convention; nonetheless, by virtue of  ‘its design and 
implementation’, it could not be considered ‘reasonable in achieving its stated scien-
tific research objectives’.6
3 Ibid., in particular, para. 86.
4 Ibid., para. 88.
5 Ibid., para. 97.
6 Ibid., para. 227.
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This twofold conclusion raises a number of  issues. Why has the analysis of  the sci-
entific research exception been split into two distinct assessments? Did the qualifica-
tion of  JARPA II as a ‘scientific research’ project amount to a silent application of  the 
margin of  appreciation doctrine? Does the interpretation of  the notion ‘for purposes 
of ’ amount to an assessment of  proportionality? And, in the case of  positive answers 
to the two previous questions, how should one reconcile the doctrine of  the margin 
of  appreciation with the doctrine of  proportionality? How, in other words, should one 
reconcile a doctrine aimed at granting a measure of  discretion to states in implement-
ing their international obligations, such as the margin of  appreciation doctrine, with 
a doctrine whose raison d’être seems precisely to rely on the need to curtail the margin 
of  appreciation of  states and to impose an international supervision of  the exercise of  
discretionary powers?
Even if  not engaging in a close discussion of  these two doctrines, which has pro-
vided the subject for an abundant flow of  scholarly inquiries, a study of  the Whaling in 
the Antarctic decision may nonetheless provide for an opportunity to observe how they 
interrelate in a particular case. The philosophical implications of  this analysis, which 
touch upon more general conceptions about international law and about the limits to 
sovereign powers, fall well beyond the limited scope of  the present contribution.7
2 Is There a Margin of  Appreciation Doctrine?
Often invoked but rarely applied, at least outside specific contexts, the very existence 
of  a margin of  appreciation doctrine appears highly controversial.8 Even logically, it 
is not easy to admit that states have a measure of  discretion about how to implement 
their international obligations. In the general theory of  law, the notion of  obligation 
is precisely aimed to curtail the discretion of  their addressees. If  one remained in this 
quite formal conceptual perspective, there would be little space, if  any, for a margin of  
appreciation doctrine. There is no need to develop a new legal doctrine to contend that 
states can freely act outside the scope of  their international obligation.
Apparently, this argument was used by the ICJ in Oil Platforms. In response to a claim 
of  the United States, who argued that ‘(a) measure of  discretion should be afforded to 
a party’s good faith application of  measures to protect its essential security interests’.9 
7 Interesting pages about the relations between margin of  appreciation and proportionality, as ‘techniques’ 
of  global constitutionalism, have been written by Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’, in J. Klabbers, A. Peters 
and G. Ufstein, The Constitutionalization of  International Law (2009) 32. See also Cannizzaro and Bonafè, 
‘Beyond the Archetypes of  Modern Legal Thought: Appraising Old and New Forms of  Interaction between 
Legal Orders’, in M. Maduro, K. Tuori and S. Sankari (eds), Transnational Law: Rethinking European Law and 
Legal Thinking (2014) 78.
8 For diverse views, see Benvenisti, ‘Margin of  Appreciation: Consensus and Universal Standards’, 31 New 
York University Journal of  International Law and Politics (1998) 843; Shany, ‘Toward a General Margin of  
Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?’, 16 European Journal of  International Law (2006) 907; A. Legg, 
The Margin of  Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: Deference and Proportionality (2012); Cot, ‘Margin 
of  Appreciation’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of  Public International Law (2013) 1012.
9 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of  Iran v. United States of  America), Judgment, 6 November 
2003, ICJ Reports (2003) 161.
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The ICJ said: ‘the requirement of  international law that measures taken avowedly in 
self-defence must have been necessary for that purpose is strict and objective, leaving 
no room for any ‘measure of  discretion’’10.
At first sight, this passage appears to be radically incompatible with the very idea 
of  the margin of  appreciation doctrine. A closer analysis suggests, however, a more 
cautious assessment. In Oil Platforms, the ICJ only considered that the existence 
of  a strict international standard of  necessity has the effect of  ruling out every 
margin of  appreciation of  individual states to assess the conditions for resorting 
to self-defence. One can hardly disagree with the ICJ. Once it had admitted that 
international law has developed a strict and objective standard of  necessity, the 
conclusion would inevitably ensue that states do not have any measure of  discre-
tion in deciding whether the conditions to resort to self-defence are met. This logi-
cal conclusion, however, leaves unprejudiced the question of  whether states enjoy 
a larger discretion in the implementation of  international norms where a looser 
international standard applies.
Properly contextualized, Oil Platforms seems thus to provide for a clear methodolog-
ical direction that may be useful to understand the factual and legal premises of  the 
margin of  appreciation doctrine.
First, it indicates that a margin of  appreciation cannot be determined in the 
abstract but merely constitutes the possible consequence of  the application of  the 
normative standards that assist in the implementation of  international rules. In 
other words, the margin of  appreciation doctrine cannot be conceived as a doctrine 
on judicial adjudication, which is applicable whenever the need arises for flexibility 
and tolerance on the part of  the judiciary. Quite the contrary, it should be considered 
to be a normative tool that governs the manoeuvring of  a state in discharging its 
international obligations.
Second, it seems to indicate that the margin of  appreciation doctrine applies to 
the secondary level of  the normative standards assisting the implementation of  
primary rules. Consequently, it has little to do with other apparently analogous 
notions that help to determine the contents of  the primary obligation, such as the 
notion of  obligations of  result, obligations to negotiate, and the like. The use of  the 
formula of  the margin of  appreciation in these other contexts is not much more 
than a convoluted means to indicate the indeterminacy of  the content of  primary 
international rules.
A quick glance at the international case law can uphold this conclusion. Even leav-
ing aside the abundant case law developed within specialized sub-systems such as the 
European Court of  Human Rights and the EU legal order, international courts and 
tribunals have, with relative frequency, recognized that states are granted a certain 
discretion in selecting and applying public policy measures susceptible to interfere 
with the implementation of  international obligations.
10 Ibid., para. 73.
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3 Margin of  Appreciation and States’ Measures of  
Public Policy
The theoretical paradigm of  this kind of  situation can be drawn from a coherent line 
of  cases, distributed along the entire case law of  the Permanent Court of  International 
Justice (PCIJ) and of  the ICJ.
In Oscar Chinn, the PCIJ found that Belgium was empowered to reduce the trans-
port tariffs on the River Congo and, consequently, to produce an adverse effect on the 
right to navigate and on the commerce of  a British company in order to assist trade 
at a time of  economic difficulties.11 After describing the deep impact of  the economic 
depression and the importance of  the fluvial transportation for the economy of  the 
colony, the Court said: ‘The Belgian Government was the sole judge of  this critical situ-
ation and of  the remedies that it called for, subject of  course to its duty of  respecting 
its international obligations.’12 This ancient case seems to denote that the discretion 
of  Belgium as ‘sole judges of  … critical situation(s)’ occurring within their territory 
and ‘of  the remedies … called for’ was not absolute but that it ought to be exercised 
in compliance with Belgium’s international obligations. Once it ascertained that the 
Belgian measures adopted to assist trade in a time of  crisis were reasonably related 
to the exceptional character of  the situation, the Court dismissed the British claim.13
This paradigm was applied and further refined in the Corfu Channel case, where the 
ICJ found that a state has the power to regulate the passage of  warships through a 
strait for the purpose of  security and public order but not to prohibit it.14 Although it 
did not unveil every single step of  its reasoning, the Court seems to have considered 
that the coastal states had the power to claim a reasonable degree of  security and, to 
this purpose, to determine the modalities of  the passage of  warship. It made this deci-
sion, however, upon the conditions that these modalities did not impair the rights of  
passage granted by international law.15
An even more liberal approach was taken by the ICJ in Elettronica Sicula S.P.A.16 
Italian local authorities had taken control of  certain plants owned by US companies, 
adducing the reason of  public policy. Subsequently, the act of  requisition was found 
by Italian judges to be unlawful under Italian law and therefore null and void. The 
USA then asked the ICJ to find that Italy’s conduct was unlawful under a bilateral 
treaty aimed at protecting the investments of  citizens of  one country against the 
arbitrary or discriminating measures of  the other. In spite of  the declared unlawful-
ness of  the requisition under Italian law, the ICJ found that such a measure did not 
11 Oscar Chinn Case (Britain v. Belgium), 1934 PCIJ Series A/B 63, No. 63.
12 Ibid., at 79.
13 Ibid., at 86.
14 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), Judgment, 9 April 1949, 
ICJ Reports (1949) 4, at 29.
15 For a general statement, see Case Concerning Rights of  Nationals of  the United States of  America in Morocco 
(France v. United States of  America), Judgment, 27 August 1952, ICJ Reports (1952) 170: ‘[T]he power 
of  making the valuation rests with the Customs authorities, but it is a power which must be exercised 
reasonably and in good faith.’
16 Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI), United States of  America v.  Italy, Judgment, 20 June 1989, ICJ Reports 
(1989) 15.
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amount to a breach of  the treaty. This was explained by the ICJ with the following 
argument: ‘Arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of  law, as some-
thing opposed to the rule of  law.’17 In this passage, the Court seems to have contended 
that measures unlawful under national law, but plausibly related to general interests, 
fall nonetheless within the realm of  domestic public policy and, therefore, could legiti-
mately justify an interference in the implementation of  the international obligation of  
the acting state.
There is a common element in these cases, which are otherwise very different from 
each other. In all of  them, invariably, the judges have recognized the primary com-
petence of  states to determine and to implement public policy requirements even at 
the cost of  interfering with their international obligations. Far from upholding the 
absolute discretion of  the claiming states, however, they reasserted that the exercise of  
these discretionary powers had to be exercised under international control. Although 
each decision seems to highlight the inherent reasonableness of  the measures spe-
cifically adopted in the pursuit of  legitimate interests, none of  them offers a clear 
explanation of  how to reconcile the discretion of  states with international control.
This is a difficult problem, indeed. On the one hand, excessive deference to states’ dis-
cretion in determining the level and intensity of  their public policy requirements may 
deprive of  effectiveness the international control over the exercise of  discretionary pow-
ers. By claiming a particularly high level of  environmental protection within its territorial 
waters, for example, a coastal state may make it particularly difficult or even impossible to 
exercise the right of  innocent passage. On the other hand, objective standards of  control 
over discretionary powers may severely restrict or even nullify the margin of  discretion 
of  states. To review measures designed to regulate the navigation in the territorial sea for 
environmental purposes, an international judge has to determine preliminarily whether 
the level of  protection for the environment claimed by the regulating state is appropriate. 
In situations such as those described above, the margin of  appreciation and the interna-
tional control over discretionary powers appear to be strictly interrelated, in the sense 
that the application of  the one doctrine may defeat the application of  the other.18
4 A Way Out of  the Dilemma: The Margin of  Appreciation 
as Part of  the Assessment of  Proportionality
These difficulties may be obviated, to an extent at least, if  one considers the mar-
gin of  appreciation doctrine as a part of  the overall assessment of  proportionality. 
17 Ibid., para. 128. See C. Henckels, Proportionality and Deference in Investor-State Arbitration (2015).
18 This difficulty emerges from Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v.  Nicaragua), 
Judgment, 13 July 2009, ICJ Reports (2009) 249, paras 87ff, 109ff. In this case, the International Court of  
Justice (ICJ) used reasonableness as a balancing standard to assess that the ‘negative impact on the exercise 
of  the rights in question [is] not manifestly excessive when measured against the protection afforded to the 
purpose invoked’. In this perspective, the level of  protection ‘afforded to the purpose invoked’ by the ter-
ritorial state determines what is the tolerable impact on the exercise of  the rights of  another state, with the 
consequence that, by raising the bar of  protection for its public policy interest, the former state can freely 
impinge upon the rights of  the latter. What lacks in the reasoning of  the ICJ is precisely an element capable 
to measure what is an appropriate level of  protection for the purposes invoked by the regulating state.
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As we all know, proportionality is a legal technique mostly employed to determine 
the legality of  unilateral measures taken by a state to protect certain interests pro-
tected by international law on the basis of  the detrimental effect produced on other 
interests that are entitled to legal protection.19 Yet one of  the logical problems sur-
rounding proportionality is how to determine the optimal level of  protection for 
the interests respectively realized and curtailed by unilateral action. The answer 
may be quite simple if  the standard of  protection is predetermined by international 
law. It is much more difficult in those cases in which no international standard is 
available.20
This is precisely the space where the margin of  appreciation doctrine has its most 
natural role. Absent an international standard, each state is obviously entitled to 
determine the most appropriate standard of  protection for its public policy require-
ments. There must be limits, however, to avoid the unlimited discretion of  setting 
this standard in a way that could excessively compress, or even defeat, the competing 
rights and interests of  others. Reasonableness is a good candidate for this role. It is a 
loose limit, which does not excessively curtail the sovereign powers of  states in regu-
lating social and economic situations occurring within their jurisdiction. At the same 
time, it can prove able to prevent states from abusively invoking sovereignty as a facile 
means for evading their international commitments.
The assumption can thus be made that, in principle, a loose limit of  reasonableness 
applies to the discretion of  states to determine the level of  protection for public policy 
requirements that may justify an interference in their international commitments. 
This relative freedom of  states, however, is offset by a strict international control on 
the appropriateness of  the means employed to achieve these legitimate purposes and 
on the appropriateness of  the interference produced on other interests equally pro-
tected by international law.
This is precisely what the ICJ did in the Whaling in the Antarctic case. First, the Court 
construed Article VIII of  the Whaling Convention as a provision conferring on Japan 
the power to derogate for purposes of  scientific research to the moratorium established 
by the schedule of  the Convention. Second, the Court recognized that the legality of  
these measures could not be determined unilaterally by the acting state but, rather, 
they were subject to international control. Finally, and more importantly to our aims, 
it determined that a limited standard of  reasonableness applied to the unilateral 
19 For general consideration on the function discharged by proportionality in the international legal order, 
I refer to my book. E. Cannizzaro, Il principio della proporzionalità nell’ordinamento internazionale (2000).
20 This issue was discussed at length in the case WTO, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of  Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R and WT/DS401/AB/R, 22 May 2014, con-
cerning the consistency with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of  a measure banning the 
importation into the European Union (EU) of  seal products for reasons of  public morality. In particular, 
in front of  the Appellate Body, Canada argued that the panel was required to ‘identify the exact content 
of  the public morality standard’ by referring to the ‘level of  protection’ set by the EU ‘when responding to 
similar interests of  moral concern’ (paras 5.199, 5.198). The Appellate Body rejected Canada’s claim, by 
relying, inter alia, on the findings of  the Panel, according to which ‘[m]embers should be given some scope 
to define and apply for themselves the concept of  public moral according to their own system and scales 
of  values’ (ibid.).
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assessment of  the notion of  scientific research but that a strict standard of  propor-
tionality applied to the unilateral assessment of  what is necessary and proper for this 
purpose.
This conclusion is tacitly but inescapably based on the idea that, absent an inter-
national law standard, every state party to the Whaling Convention enjoys a certain 
margin of  discretion in the definition of  the term ‘scientific research’. After refusing, 
in paragraph 86, to offer a general definition of  ‘scientific research’ and after a lengthy 
technical analysis of  the activities led by Japan, the ICJ concluded, in paragraph 127 
and in paragraph 227, that ‘the JARPA II activities involving the lethal sampling of  
whales can broadly be characterized as scientific research’.
5 Concluding Remarks
While tacitly dismissing the idea of  the margin of  appreciation as a doctrine having a 
general scope, the ICJ seems to have assigned it a narrower role. Limited to its proper 
context, the margin of  appreciation doctrine seems to have gained precision, and has 
made sense of  the claim of  states to determine the contents of  notions pertaining 
to domestic policy, in the context of  the international control of  the exercise of  dis-
cretionary powers. In spite of  its modest tone, therefore, the Whaling in the Antarctic 
decision has implications going far beyond the facts of  this particular case. Although 
presenting its conclusions as the result of  a purely interpretative operation, the Court, 
in fact, has done something more: it has shaped the contours of  a sophisticated system 
of  international supervision that incorporates subjective and objective standards; it 
has shed some light on the logical consecution of  the various steps that compose the 
complex assessment of  proportionality and it has unravelled some of  the mysteries 
still lingering around this doctrine.
